Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 232-237

  Likhodedov, Anton ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; REVENUE; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES (VCG) MECHANISM; VIRTUAL VALUATION COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS (VVCA);

COMBINATORIAL CIRCUITS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ELECTRONIC COMMUNITIES; MATHEMATICAL TRANSFORMATIONS; OPTIMIZATION; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 9444277786     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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