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Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-8

Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Aggregation

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NEW RESULTS; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS; PREFERENCE ELICITATION; UNCERTAINTY; VOTING RULES;

EID: 85167414701     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (14)

References (14)
  • 1
    • 0001511919 scopus 로고
    • Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
    • Bartholdi, J., and Orlin, J. 1991. Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare 8(4):341-354.
    • (1991) Social Choice and Welfare , vol.8 , Issue.4 , pp. 341-354
    • Bartholdi, J.1    Orlin, J.2
  • 2
    • 0000733155 scopus 로고
    • The computational difficulty of manipulating and election
    • Bartholdi, J.; Tovey, C.; and Trick, M. 1989. The computational difficulty of manipulating and election. Social Choice and Welfare 6(3):227-241.
    • (1989) Social Choice and Welfare , vol.6 , Issue.3 , pp. 227-241
    • Bartholdi, J.1    Tovey, C.2    Trick, M.3
  • 3
    • 0001786352 scopus 로고
    • On the rationale of group decision-making
    • Black, D. 1948. On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy 56(1):23-34.
    • (1948) Journal of Political Economy , vol.56 , Issue.1 , pp. 23-34
    • Black, D.1
  • 4
    • 0036930295 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A POMDP formulation of preference elicitation problems
    • American Association for Artificial Intelligence
    • Boutilier, C. 2002. A POMDP formulation of preference elicitation problems. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on AI, 239-246. American Association for Artificial Intelligence.
    • (2002) Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on AI , pp. 239-246
    • Boutilier, C.1
  • 5
    • 0036923193 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
    • a American Association for Artificial Intelligence
    • Conitzer, V., and Sandholm, T. 2002a. Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on AI. American Association for Artificial Intelligence.
    • (2002) Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on AI
    • Conitzer, V.1    Sandholm, T.2
  • 6
    • 0036927806 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness
    • b American Association for Artificial Intelligence
    • Conitzer, V., and Sandholm, T. 2002b. Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on AI. American Association for Artificial Intelligence.
    • (2002) Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on AI
    • Conitzer, V.1    Sandholm, T.2
  • 8


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.