False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves mechanism with submodular approximation

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 1135-1142

  Yokoo, Makoto ^a   Matsutani, Toshihiro ^a   Iwasaki, Atsushi ^a  

^a KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auction; Strategy proof

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PARETO PRINCIPLE;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; FALSE NAME PROOF; PARETO EFFICIENT ALLOCATION; STRATEGY PROOF;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 34247268254     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160840     Document Type: Conference Paper

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