Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 180-188

  Lahaie, Sebastien M ^a   Parkes, David C ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Learning; Preference elicitatiqn

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; POLYNOMIALS; PROBLEM SOLVING; QUERY LANGUAGES;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; POLYNOMIAL COMMUNICATIONS; PREFERENCE ELICITATION;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 3242792524     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988800     Document Type: Conference Paper

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