Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 72-87

  Bartal, Yair ^a   Gonen, Rica ^a   Nisan, Noam ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; FIXED NUMBERS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; MULTI-UNIT COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; NATURAL MODELS; VCG MECHANISM;

COMMERCE;

EID: 85013990027     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/846241.846250     Document Type: Conference Paper

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