Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 644-652

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Nisan, Noam ^a   Schapira, Michael ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Combinatorial Auctions; Incentive Compatibility

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; RANDOM PROCESSES;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; SOCIAL WELFARE;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS;

EID: 33748116693     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1132516.1132607     Document Type: Conference Paper

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