The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in internet auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 174-188

  Yokoo, Makoto ^a   Sakurai, Yuko ^a   Matsubara, Shigeo ^a  

^a NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

Auction; Mechanism design; Strategy proof

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347031344     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9     Document Type: Article

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