Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

Journal of the ACM

Volumn 49, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 577-602

  Lehmann, Daniel ^a   O'Callaghan, Liadan Ita ^b,c   Shoham, Yoav ^b,c  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Computational complexity; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

BIDDING; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; GENERALIZED VICKERY AUCTION (GVA); TRUTH REVELATION;

ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; SALES;

COMMERCE;

EID: 0242550383     PISSN: 00045411     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/585265.585266     Document Type: Article

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