Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness

Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2007

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 102-111

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; INHERENT LIMITATIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; SINGLE-AGENT; VERIFICATION PROTOCOL;

MACHINE DESIGN;

INTERNET PROTOCOLS;

EID: 76649126660     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1324249.1324265     Document Type: Conference Paper

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