Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2002, Pages 379-384

  Mu'alem, Ahuva ^a   Nisan, Noam ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; GAME THEORY; HEURISTIC METHODS; INTERNET; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; THEOREM PROVING;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0036932302     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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