Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions

Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)

Volumn 3120, Issue , 2004, Pages 1-16

  Santi, Paolo ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^b   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b  

^a Istituto di informatica e telematica del Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche   (Italy)

^b Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; FUNCTIONS; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; QUERY LANGUAGES; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTERS;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY; POLYNOMIAL ELICITATION; SPECTRUM LICENSES; AMOUNT OF INFORMATION; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; PREFERENCE ELICITATION;

POLYNOMIALS; COMMERCE;

EID: 9444255254     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-27819-1_1     Document Type: Conference Paper

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