Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 521-528

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions and exchanges; VCG mechanism

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COST ACCOUNTING; PROBLEM SOLVING;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS AND EXCHANGES; VCG MECHANISM;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 34247184156     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160729     Document Type: Conference Paper

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