Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2005, Pages 248-254

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a   Santi, Paolo ^b  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

^b Istituto di informatica e telematica del Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARBITRARY FUNCTION; CARDINALITY; OPTIMAL ALLOCATION; SUPER-POLYNOMIAL;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; FUNCTIONS; POLYNOMIALS; PROBLEM SOLVING; QUERY LANGUAGES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 29344443544     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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