Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 338-344

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Nisan, Noam ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Incentive compatibility

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS;

AUCTION SETTINGS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; VCG PAYMENT;

APPROXIMATION THEORY;

EID: 35448999665     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250790.1250842     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (29)

1. A. Archer, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar, and E. Tardos. An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agent. In SODA'03.
2. Sanjeev Arora. Polynomial time approximation schemes for Euclidean traveling salesman and other geometric problems. Journal of the ACM, 45(5):753-782, 1998.
3. Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen. Computationally-feasible auctions for convex bundles. In APPROX'04.
4. Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, and Noam Nisan. Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. In TARK 03, 2003.
5. Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski. Welfare maximization in congestion games. To appear in IEEE JSAC special issue on Non-Cooperative Behavior in Networking. Preliminary version in EC'06.
6. E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, pages 17-33, 1971.
7. Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan. Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. 2006. To appear in EC'07.
8. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctionss with complement-free bidders. In STOC'05.
9. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In STOC'06.
10. Shahar Dobzinski and Michael Schapira. An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. In SODA'06.
11. Uriel Feige. On maximizing welfare where the utility functions are subadditive. In STOC'06.
12. Uriel Feige and Jan Vondrak. Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1-1/e. In FOCS'06.
13. T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, pages 617-631, 1973.
14. Ron Holzman, Noa Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Bundling equilibrium in combinatrial auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 47:104-123, 2004.
15. Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, and Aranyak Mehta. Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions. In WINE'05.
16. Eyal Kushilevitz and Noam Nisan. Communication Complexity. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
17. Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, and Noam Nisan. Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions.
18. Ron Lavi and Chaitanya Swamy. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In FOCS'05.
19. Benny Lehmann, Daniel Lehmann, and Noam Nisan. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. In EC'01.
20. Daniel Lehmann, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan, and Yoav Shoham. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. In JACM 49(5), pages 577-602, Sept. 2002.
21. A. Mas-Collel, W. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford university press, 1995.
22. Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. In AAAI-02, 2002.
23. Noam Nisan. The communication complexity of approximate set packing and covering. In ICALP 2002.
24. Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Computationally feasible vcg-based mechanisms. In EC'00.
25. Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behaviour, 35:166-196, 2001. A preliminary version appeared in STOC 1999.
26. Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices, 2006. In the Journal of Economic Theory.
27. Kevin Roberts. The characterization of implementable choise rules. In Jean-Jacques Laffont, editor, Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Papers presented at the first European Summer Workshop of the Economic Society, pages 321-349. North-Holland, 1979.
28. Vijay V. Vazirani. Approximation algorithms. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 2001.
29. W. Vickrey. Counter-speculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, pages 8-37, 1961.