When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate

Journal of the ACM

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2007, Pages

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a,d   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b,e   Lang, Jér̂me ^c  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c IRIT   (France)

^d Duke University   (United States)

^e Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational social choice; Hardness of manipulation; Voting

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE; MANIPULATION ALGORITHMS; SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE (STV); VOTING;

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 34250337396     PISSN: 00045411     EISSN: 1557735X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1236457.1236461     Document Type: Article

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