Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 781-788

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPLEXITY CLASS; GENERAL METHOD; MULTI-AGENT SETTING; NEW PROTOCOL; NP-HARD; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS; SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS; VOTING PROTOCOLS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84880802690     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

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