Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 132-141

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Automated Mechanism Design; Combinatorial Auctions; Revenue Maximization

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ECONOMICS; FUNCTION EVALUATION; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; PROBLEM SOLVING; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

AUTOMATED MECHANISM DESIGN; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 3242754280     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988793     Document Type: Conference Paper

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