Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1366-1371

  Lang, Jér̂ome ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS; AGGREGATION RULES; CARTESIAN PRODUCTS; COLLECTIVE DECISION; LINEAR ORDER; PREFERENCE RELATION; REAL-WORLD; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 84880878949     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (8)

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4. S. Brams and P. Fishburn. Voting procedures. In Handbook of Social choice and Welfare, chapter 4. Elsevier, 2004.
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6. J. Lang. Logical preference representation and combinatorial vote. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 42(1):37-71, 2004.
7. F. Rossi, K. Venable, and T. Walsh. mCP-nets: representing and reasoning with preference of multiple agents. In Proceedings of AAAI-04, 2004.
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