Characterization of strategy/false-name proof combinatorial auction protocols: Price-oriented, rationing-free protocol

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 733-739

  Yokoo, Makoto ^a  

^a NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; PROTOCOL CANS; PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION; STRATEGY PROOFS; SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COSTS;

CHARACTERIZATION;

EID: 84880767427     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

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