The computational complexity of choice sets

Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2007

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 82-91

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Fischer, Felix ^a   Harrenstein, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; HARDNESS RESULT; INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE; NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN; SOCIAL CHOICE RULES; STABLE SETS;

GAME THEORY;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 38449114554     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1324249.1324263     Document Type: Conference Paper

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