Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice

Proceedings of the 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 12th Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2000

Volumn , Issue , 2000, Pages 74-81

  Parkes, David C ^a   Ungar, Lyle H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION; COMMERCE;

ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS; AUCTION THEORY; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; DISTRIBUTED SCHEDULING; DISTRIBUTED TASKS; NON-ADDITIVE; OPTIMAL AUCTION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM; TASKS ASSIGNMENTS; THEORY AND PRACTICE;

SITE SELECTION;

EID: 84902292277     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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