Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 130, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 167-181

  Yokoo, Makoto ^a   Sakurai, Yuko ^a   Matsubara, Shigeo ^a  

^a NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

Auction; Electronic commerce; Game theory; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION MAKING; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GAME THEORY; INTERNET;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION PROTOCOLS; FALSE NAME BIDS; LEVELED DIVISION SET (LDS) PROTOCOLS; PARETO EFFICIENCY;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 0035422448     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00077-7     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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12. The effect of false-name declarations in mechanism design: Towards collective decision making on the Internet