Exact complexity of the winner problem for young elections

Theory of Computing Systems

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 375-386

  Rothe, Jörg ^a   Spakowski, Holger ^a   Vogel, Jörg ^b  

^a HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

RANKING PROBLEM;

CONSTRAINT THEORY; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; POLYNOMIALS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 0041492960     PISSN: 14324350     EISSN: 14330490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00224-002-1093-z     Document Type: Article

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