Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and logical foundations

Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

Volumn 9780521899437, Issue , 2008, Pages 1-483

  Shoham, Yoav ^a   Leyton Brown, Kevin ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER CIRCUITS; COMPUTER GAMES; COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION; DECISION THEORY; EDUCATION; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; MACHINE DESIGN; MARKOV PROCESSES; MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; ONLINE SYSTEMS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; PROBABILITY;

COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; DISTRIBUTED PROBLEM SOLVING; GRADUATE COURSE; LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS; MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-AGENT COMMUNICATIONS; PROBABILITY THEORY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84924111881     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511811654     Document Type: Book

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