Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 389-403

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a,b   Tardos, Éva ^a  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942509632     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.004     Document Type: Article

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