Fictitious play property for games with identical interests

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 258-265

  Monderer, Dov ^a   Shapley, Lloyd S ^b  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029690246     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0014     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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4. 4. V. KRISHNA, Learning in games with strategic complementarities, mimeo, 1991.
5. 5. P. MILGROM AND J. ROBERTS, Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games, Games Econ. Behavior 3 (1991), 82-100.
6. 6. K. MIYASAWA, On the convergence of the learning process in a 2 × 2 non-zero-sum two person game, Economic Research Program, Princeton University, Research Memorandum No. 33, 1961.
7. 7. D. MONDERER AND L. S. SHAPLEY, Potential games, mimeo, 1988. Games Econ. Behavior, forthcoming.
8. 8. D. MONDERER AND A. SELA, Fictitious play and no-cycling conditions, mimeo, 1992.
9. 9. D. MONDERER AND A. SELA, A 2 × 2 game without the fictitious play property, mimeo, 1994. Games Econ. Behavior, forthcoming.
10. 10. J. ROBINSON, An iterative method of solving a game, Ann. Math. 54 (1951), 296-301.
11. 11. L. S. SHAPLEY, Some topics in two-person games, in "Advances in Game Theory" (M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker, Eds.), pp. 1-29, Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1964.
12. 12. L. THORLUND-PETERSEN, Iterative computation of Cournot equilibrium, Games Econ. Behavior 2 (1990), 61-95.