Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions

Journal of Computer and System Sciences

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 21-41

  Feigenbaum, Joan ^a   Papadimitriou, Christos H ^b   Shenker, Scott ^c  

^a Yale University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SCIENCE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGEBRA; ALGORITHMS; BOUNDARY CONDITIONS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ECONOMICS; TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS;

COST SHARING; MARGINAL COST; OPTIMAL MULTICAST TREE; SHAPLEY VALUE;

MULTICASTING;

EID: 0035416195     PISSN: 00220000     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jcss.2001.1754     Document Type: Article

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