k-implementation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 19-28

  Monderer, Dov ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Implementation by an interested party; Implementation cost; Implementation theory

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY;

DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; IMPLEMENTATION THEORY;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242456255     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779928.779931     Document Type: Conference Paper

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