Core-selecting package auctions

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 36, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 393-407

  Day, Robert ^a   Milgrom, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Combinatorial bidding; Core; Core selecting auctions; Incentives; Marriage problem; Menu auctions; Package bidding; Proxy auctions; Stable matching; Truncation strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 40149100485     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7     Document Type: Article

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