Strategic Learning and its Limits

Strategic Learning and its Limits

Volumn 9780199269181, Issue , 2011, Pages 1-180

  Young, H Peyton ^a,b  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Arne Ryde Lectures; Bayesian Learning; Convergence; Hypothesis Testing; Interactive Learning; Performance; Strategic Learning; Theoretical Developments

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920627764     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269181.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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