Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games

Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 103-122

  Nachbar, John H ^a   Zame, William R ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Computable strategies; Repeated games; Turing machines

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030306234     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf01212014     Document Type: Article

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