Frugal path mechanisms

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn 06-08-January-2002, Issue , 2002, Pages 991-999

  Archer, Aaron ^a,b   Tardos, Eva ^c  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b IBM ALMADEN RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

^c Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COSTS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

ACTUAL COST; ALTERNATE PATH; ECONOMIC AGENTS; GENERAL CLASS; NODE-DISJOINT; PATH PROBLEMS; TRUTH-TELLING; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

GRAPH THEORY;

EID: 84968754878     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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