Cheap Talk

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 103-118

  Farrell, Joseph ^a,b   Rabin, Matthew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542740995     PISSN: 08953309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.3.103     Document Type: Article

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