Hardness results for multicast cost sharing

Theoretical Computer Science

Volumn 304, Issue 1-3, 2003, Pages 215-236

  Feigenbaum, Joan ^a   Krishnamurthy, Arvind ^a   Sami, Rahul ^a   Shenker, Scott ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SCIENCE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Communication complexity; Multicast

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COSTS; GAME THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

MULTICAST COST SHARING;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

EID: 0038825527     PISSN: 03043975     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3975(03)00085-9     Document Type: Article

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