The price of anarchy and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 543-568

  Johari, Ramesh ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

ALLOCATION MECHANISM; ECONOMIC PROBLEMS; EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS; INFINITELY DIVISIBLE; MARKET CLEARING PRICE; PROPORTIONAL ALLOCATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM; SCALABLE RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

COSTS;

EID: 84926127454     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.023     Document Type: Chapter

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