Frugality in Path Auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn 15, Issue , 2004, Pages 694-702

  Elkind, Edith ^a   Sahai, Amit ^a   Steiglitz, Ken ^a  

^a Princeton University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BIN-NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES; HALFNORMAL DISTRIBUTION (HD); INTERNET PROTOCOLS;

BOUNDARY VALUE PROBLEMS; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; INTEGRAL EQUATIONS; INTERNET; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING;

GRAPH THEORY;

EID: 1842539398     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (12)

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12. W. VICKREY, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961