A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

Econometrica

Volumn 68, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 1127-1150

  Hart, Sergiu ^a   Mas Colell, Andreu ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Adaptive procedure; Correlated equilibrium; No regret; Regret matching; Simple strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000908510     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00153     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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