Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 407-435

  Johari, Ramesh ^a   Tsitsiklis, John N ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication networks; Distributed resource allocation; Network pricing

Indexed keywords

CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); EFFICIENCY; GAME THEORY; INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SYSTEMS; INTERNET; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS;

DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE ALLOCATION; NETWORK PRICING;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 5544317207     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1040.0091     Document Type: Article

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