A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

Economic Theory

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 155-180

  Williams, Steven R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Groves mechanisms; Incentive compatibility; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033414601     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050286     Document Type: Article

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