Efficient computation of behavior strategies

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 220-246

  Von Stengel, Bernhard ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030167455     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0050     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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