Complexity results about Nash equilibria

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 765-771

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tiiomas ^a  

^a Computer Science Department ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM; COMPLEXITY RESULTS; CONNECTED SETS; HARDNESS RESULT; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NATURAL PROPERTIES; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; GAME THEORY; HARDNESS;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 84880852207     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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