Conditional Universal Consistency1

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 104-130

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Levine, David K ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008547696     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0705     Document Type: Article

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