New criteria and a new algorithm for learning in multi-agent systems

Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages

  Powers, Rob ^a   Shoham, Yoav ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LEARNING ALGORITHMS;

AVERAGE REWARD; BEST RESPONSE; GAME-THEORETIC; MAXIMIN; NOVEL ALGORITHM; REPEATED GAMES; SECURITY LEVEL; SELF-PLAY;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84898936075     PISSN: 10495258     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (19)

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