Axiomatic foundations for ranking systems

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 31, Issue , 2008, Pages 473-495

  Altman, Alon ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^b  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION ANALYSIS; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SEARCH ENGINES;

AXIOMATIZATION; FUNDAMENTAL AXIOMS; RANKING SYSTEMS; SOCIAL RANKING;

CASE BASED REASONING;

EID: 44449135071     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2306     Document Type: Article

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