Chapter 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 1723-1759

  Von Stengel, Bernhard ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

degenerate game; equilibrium computation; extensive game; Lemke Howson algorithm; perfect equilibrium; pivoting

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649370955     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03008-4     Document Type: Review

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