Chapter 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 1597-1663

  Hillas, John ^a   Kohlberg, Elon ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

correlated equilibrium; equilibrium refinement; Nash equilibrium; strategic equilibrium; strategic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649342399     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03005-9     Document Type: Review

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