Auction theory: A guide to the literature

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 227-286

  Klemperer, Paul ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Auction theory; Auctions; Bidding; Common value auctions; Mechanism design; Private value auctions

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY;

EID: 0032804976     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00083     Document Type: Article

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