Behavioral political economy: A survey

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 40, Issue , 2015, Pages 395-417

  Schnellenbach, Jan ^a,b   Schubert, Christian ^c  

^a BRANDENBURG UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

^b Walter Eucken Institut   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL   (Germany)

Author keywords

Behavioral political economy; Cognitive biases; Paternalism; Rational irrationality; Social norms; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84930709373     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.002     Document Type: Article

References (279)

1. Akerlof G.A. The economics of illusion. Econ. Polit. 1989, 1:1-15.
2. Akerlof G.A., Dickens W.T. The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance. Am. Econ. Rev. 1982, 72:307-319.
3. Akerlof G.A., Kranton R.E. Economics and identity. Q. J. Econ. 2000, 115:715-753.
4. Alesina A., Angeletos G.-M. Fairness and redistribution. Am. Econ. Rev. 2005, 95:960-980.
5. Alesina A., Drazen A. Why are stabilizations delayed?. Am. Econ. Rev. 1991, 81:1170-1188.
6. Algan Y., Cahuc P. Civic virtue and labor market institutions. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 2009, 1:111-145.
7. Alm J. Measuring, explaining and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments and field studies. Int. Tax Public Financ. 2012, 19:54-77.
8. Arnold D. Benefit morale and cross-country diversity in sick pay entitlements. Kyklos 2013, 66:27-45.
9. Arrow K.J. Social Choice and Individual Values 1951, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
10. Ashworth S., Bueno de Mesquita E. Is voter competence good for voters? Information, rationality, and democratic performance. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 2014, 108:565-587.
11. Augenblick N., Nicholson S. Ballot position, choice fatigue and voter behavior. Working Paper 2012, University of California, Berkeley.
12. Baron J., McCaffery E.J. Starving the beast. The political psychology of budget deficits. Fiscal Challenges. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy 2008, 221-241. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). E. Garrett, E. Graddy, H.E. Jackson (Eds.).
13. Bastounis M., Leiser D., Roland-Lévy C. Psychosocial variables involved in the construction of lay thinking about the economy: results of a cross-national survey. J. Econ. Psychol. 2004, 25:263-278.
14. Baumeister R. The self. Handbook of Social Psychology 1998, 680-740. Wiley, Boston. D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, G. Lindzey (Eds.).
15. Bednar J., Jones-Rooy A., Page S.E. Choosing a future based on the past: institutions, behavior and path dependence. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:312-332. (in this issue).
16. Belke A., Potrafke N. Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries. J. Int. Money Financ. 2012, 31:1126-1139.
17. Bénabou R., Tirole J. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 2003, 70:489-520.
18. Bennedsen M., Feldmann S.E. Informational lobbying and political contributions. J. Public Econ. 2006, 90:631-656.
19. Berggren N. Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics. Rev. Austrian Econ. 2012, 25:199-221.
20. Berggren N., Jordahl H., Poutvaara P. The looks of a winner: beauty and electoral success. J. Public Econ. 2010, 94:8-15.
21. Bernecker, A., Gathmann, C., 2013. Trial and error? Policy experimentation during the US welfare reform. Mimeo. University of Heidelberg.
22. Bernheim D.B., Rangel A. Behavioral public economics: welfare and policy analysis with nonstandard decision-makers. Behavioral Economics and its Applications 2007, 7-77. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. P. Diamond, H. Vartiainen (Eds.).
23. Bernheim D.B., Rangel A. Beyond revealed preference: choice-theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics. Q. J. Econ. 2009, 124:51-104.
24. Besley T. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government 2006, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
25. Besley T. The new political economy. Econ. J. 2007, 117:F570-F587.
26. Banzhaf H.S., Oates W.E. On fiscal illusion and Ricardian equivalence in local public finance. NBER Working Paper 2012, 18040. NBER, Cambridge MA.
27. Bischoff I., Siemers L.H.R. Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies. Public Choice 2013, 156:163-180.
28. Bischoff I., Neuhaus C., Weber B. The neuroeconomics of voting: neural evidence of different sources of utility in voting. J. Neurosci. Psychol. Econ. 2013, 6:215-135.
29. Bjørnskov C., Méon P.-G. Is trust the missing root of institutions, education and development?. Public Choice 2013, 157:641-669.
30. Bjørnskov C., Paldam M. The spirits of capitalism and socialism. Across-country study of ideology. Public Choice 2012, 150:469-498.
31. Bjørnskov C., Potrafke N. The size and scope of government in the United States: does party ideology matter?. Int. Tax Public Financ. 2013, 20:687-714.
32. Black D. On the rationale of group decision-making. J. Polit. Econ. 1948, 56:23-34.
33. Boettke P., Coyne C., Leeson P. Comparative historical political economy. J. Inst. Econ. 2013, 9:285-301.
34. Boland L.A. On the Futility of Criticizing the Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis. Am. Econ. Rev. 1981, 71(5):1031-1036.
35. Bolton G.E., Ockenfels A. Behavioral economic engineering. J. Econ. Psychol. 2012, 33:665-676.
36. Brennan G. Selection and the currency of reward. The Theory of Institutional Design 1996, 256-276. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). R.E. Goodin (Ed.).
37. Brennan G. Psychological dimensions in voter choice. Public Choice 2008, 137:475-489.
38. Brennan G., Buchanan J.M. Voter choice- evaluating political alternatives. Am. Behav. Sci. 1984, 28:185-201.
39. Brennan G., Hamlin A. Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 1998, 95:149-175.
40. Brennan G., Hamlin A. On political representation. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 1999, 29:109-127.
41. Brennan G., Hamlin A. Democratic Devices and Desires 2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
42. Brennan G., Hamlin A. Expressive constitutionalism. Constit. Polit. Econ. 2002, 13:299-313.
43. Brennan G., Lomasky L. Inefficient unanimity. J. Appl. Philos. 1984, 1:151-163.
44. Brennan G., Lomasky L. Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference 1993, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
45. Buchanan J.M. Individual choice in voting and the market. J. Polit. Econ. 1954, 62:334-343.
46. Buchanan J.M. The fiscal illusion. Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 1967, 126-143. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. J.M. Buchanan (Ed.).
47. Buchanan J.M. Adam Smith on public choice. Public Choice 1976, 25:81-82.
48. Buchanan J.M. The constitution of economic policy. Am. Econ. Rev. 1987, 77:243-250.
49. Buchanan J.M., Wagner R.E. Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes 1977, Academic Press, New York.
50. Camerer C., Issacharoff S., Loewenstein G., O'Donoghue T., Rabin M. Regulation for conservatives. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2003, 151:1211-1254.
51. Camerer C., Loewenstein G., Rabin M. Advances in Behavioral Economics 2004, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
52. Cameron L.A. Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: experimental evidence from Indonesia. Econ. Inq. 1999, 27:47-59.
53. Caplan B. Rational irrationality and the microfoundations of political failure. Public Choice 2001, 107:311-331.
54. Caplan B. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies 2006, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
55. Caplan B. Irrational principals. Rev. Austrian Econ. 2009, 22:159-167.
56. Carlsson F., Johansson-Stenman O. Why do you vote and vote as you do?. Kyklos 2010, 63:495-516.
57. Carter J., Guerette S. An experimental study of expressive voting. Public Choice 1992, 73:251-260.
58. Cason T.N., Plott C.R. Misconceptions and game form recognition: challenges to theories of revealed preference and framing. J. Polit. Econ. 2014, 122:1235-1270.
59. Charness G., Masclet D., Villeval M.C. The dark side of competition for status. Manag. Sci. 2013, 60:38-55.
60. Choi S.J., Pritchard A.C. Behavioral economics and the SEC. Stanford Law Rev. 2003, 56:1-73.
61. Choi S.J., Gulati M., Posner E.A. Are judges overpaid? A skeptical response to the judicial salary debate. J. Leg. Anal. 2009, 1:47-117.
62. Chong D., Druckman J.N. Framing public opinion in competitive democracies. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 2007, 101:637-655.
63. Conley D., Rauscher E. The effect of daughters on partisanship. NBER Working Paper 2010, 15873. NBER, Cambridge, MA.
64. Cooper J.C., Kovacic W.E. Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior. J. Regul. Econ. 2012, 41:41-58.
65. Corazzini L., Kube S., Maréchal M.A., Nicoló A. Elections and deceptions: theory and experimental evidence Am. J. Polit. Sci. 2014, 58:579-592.
66. Cordes C., Schubert C. Role models that make you unhappy: light paternalism, social learning and welfare. J. Inst. Econ. 2013, 9:131-159.
67. Corneo G. Work norms and the welfare state. CESifo Econ. Stud. 2012, 58:599-625.
68. Costa-Font J., Cowell F. Social identity and redistributive preferences: a survey. J. Econ. Surv. 2015, 29:357-374.
69. Cowen T. Self-constraint versus self-liberation. Ethics 1991, 101:360-373.
70. Cowen T. Self-deception as the root of political failure. Public Choice 2005, 124:437-451.
71. Dalton P.S., Ghosal S. Behavioral decisions and policy. CESifo Econ. Stud. 2011, 57:560-580.
72. Deci E.L., Ryan R.M. The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychol. Inq. 2000, 11:227-268.
73. Degan A., Li M. Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:242-259. (in this issue).
74. Dell'Anno R., Dollery B. Comparative fiscal illusion: a fiscal illusion index for the European Union. MPRA Working paper 2012, MPRA, Munich.
75. DellaVigna S. Psychology and economics: evidence from the field. J. Econ. Lit. 2009, 47:315-372.
76. DellaVigna S., Kaplan E. The Fox News effect: media bias and voting. Q. J. Econ. 2007, 117:1187-1234.
77. Della Vigna S., List J., Malmendier U., Rao G. Voting to tell others. NBER Working Paper 2013, 19832. NBER, Cambridge, MA.
78. Denzau A.T., North D.C. Shared mental models: ideologies and institutions. Kyklos 1994, 47:3-31.
79. Delli Carpini M.X., Keeter S. What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters 1996, Yale University Press, New Haven.
80. Dinas E. Why does the apple fall far from the tree? How early political socialization prompts parent-child dissimilarity. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 2014, 44:827-852.
81. Dittmann I., Kübler D., Maug E., Mechtenberg L. Why votes have value: instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors. Games Econ. Behav. 2014, 84:17-38.
82. Dixit A.K. The making of economic policy. A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective 1996, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
83. Dollery B., Worthington A. The empirical analysis of fiscal illusion. J. Econ. Surv. 1996, 10:261-297.
84. Downs A. An Economic Theory of Democracy 1957, Harper & Brothers, New York.
85. Esarey J., Salmon T.C., Barrilleaux C. What motivates political preferences? Self-interest, ideology, and fairness in a laboratory democracy. Econ. Inq. 2012, 50:604-624.
86. Feddersen T.J. Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting. J. Econ. Perspect. 2004, 18:99-112.
87. Ferejohn J.A., Fiorina M.P. The paradox of not voting: a decision-theoretic analysis. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1974, 68:525-536.
88. Findley T.S. Hyperbolic memory discounting and the political business cycle. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:345-359. (in this issue).
89. Fischhoff B. For those condemned to study the past: reflective on historical judgement. New Directions for Methodology of Behavioural Science: Fallible Judgments in Behavioural Research 1980, 73-93. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. R.A. Schwede, D.W. Fiske (Eds.).
90. Fiorina M.P. The voting decision: instrumental and expressive aspects. J. Polit. 1976, 21:601-625.
91. Fiorina M.P., Plott C.R. Committee decisions under majority rule: an experimental study. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1978, 72:575-598.
92. Frey B.S. A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues. Econ. J. 1997, 107:1043-1053.
93. Frey B.S. Not Just for the Money. An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation 1997, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
94. Frey B.S. Happiness: A Revolution in Economics 2008, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
95. Frey B.S., Eichenberger R. Anomalies in political economy. Public Choice 1991, 68:71-89.
96. Frey B.S., Meier S. Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: testing 'conditional cooperation' in a field experiment. Am. Econ. Rev. 2004, 94:1717-1722.
97. Frey B.S., Neckermann S. Awards: a view from psychological economics. J. Psychol. 2008, 216:198-208.
98. Frey B.S., Stutzer A. Beyond outcomes: measuring procedural utility. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 2005, 57:90-111.
99. Frey B.S., Stutzer A. Happiness and public choice. Public Choice 2010, 144:557-573.
100. Frey B.S., Stutzer A. The use of happiness research in public policy. Soc. Choice Welf. 2012, 38:659-674.
101. Frey B.S., Benz M., Stutzer A. Introducing procedural utility: not only what, but also how matters. J. Inst. Theor. Econ. 2004, 160:377-401.
102. Frohlich N., Oppenheimer J., Eavey C. Laboratory results on Rawls' distributive justice. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 1987, 17:1-21.
103. Fumagalli R. The futile search for true utility. Econ. Philos. 2013, 29:326-347.
104. Fischbacher U., Gächter S. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 2010, 100:541-556.
105. Gagliarducci S., Nannicini T. Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2013, 11:369-398.
106. Galasso V., Nannicini T. So closed: political selection in proportional systems. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:260-273. (in this issue).
107. Gennaioli N., Shleifer A. What comes to mind?. Q. J. Econ. 2010, 125:1399-1433.
108. Gentzkow M.A., Shapiro J.M. Media, education and anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. J. Econ. Perspect. 2004, 18:117-133.
109. Georgellis Y., Iossa E., Tabvuma V. Crowding out intrinsic motivation in the public sector. J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 2011, 21:473-493.
110. Gerber E. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation 1999, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
111. Geys B. Explaining voter turnout: a review of aggregate-level research. Elect. Stud. 2006, 25:637-663.
112. Gigerenzer G., Gaissmaier W. Heuristic decision making. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2011, 62:451-482.
113. Glaeser E.L. The political economy of hatred. Q. J. Econ. 2005, 120:45-86.
114. Glaeser E.L. Paternalism and psychology. University of Chicago Law Review 2006, 73:133-156.
115. Gneezy U., Rustichini A. A fine is a price. J. Leg. Stud. 2000, 29:1-17.
116. Green D.P., Shapiro J. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science 1994, Yale University Press, New Haven.
117. Gul F., Pesendorfer W. Welfare and happiness. Am. Econ. Rev. 2007, 97:471-476.
118. Gul F., Pesendorfer W. The case for mindless economics. The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics 2008, 3-39. Oxford University Press, Oxford. A. Caplin, A. Schotter (Eds.).
119. Guttman J.M., Hilger N., Shachmurove Y. Voting as investment vs. voting as consumption: new evidence. Kyklos 1994, 47:197-207.
120. Haferkamp A., Belschak F., Enste D., Fetchenhauer D. Efficiency versus fairness: the evaluation of labor market policies by economists and laypeople. J. Econ. Psychol. 2009, 30:527-539.
121. Hall R.L., Deardorff A.V. Lobbying as legislative subsidy. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 2006, 100:69-84.
122. Halla M., Lackner M., Schneider F. An empirical analysis of the dynamics of the welfare state: the case of benefit morale. Kyklos 2010, 63:44-74.
123. Hamlin A., Jennings C. Group formation and political conflict: instrumental and expressive approaches. Public Choice 2004, 118:413-435.
124. Hamlin A., Jennings C. Expressive political behaviour: foundations, scope and implications. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 2011, 41:645-670.
125. Hargreaves Heap S. The meaning of behavioral economics. Camb. J. Econ. 2013, 37:985-1000.
126. Harstad R., Selten R. Diminished-dimensional political economy. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, (in this issue).
127. Hasnain Z., Manning N., Pierskalla J.H. Performance-related pay in the public sector. A review of theory and evidence. Policy Research Working Paper No. 6043 2012, World Bank, Washington, DC.
128. Hausman D.M., McPherson M.S. Preference satisfaction and welfare economics. Econ. Philos. 2009, 25:1-25.
129. Hausman D.M., Welch B. To nudge or not to nudge. J. Polit. Philos. 2010, 18:123-136.
130. Heinemann F. Is the welfare state self-destructive? A study of government benefit morale. Kyklos 2008, 61:237-257.
131. Heinemann F., Tanz B. The impact of trust on reforms. J. Econ. Policy Reform. 2008, 11:173-185.
132. Heukelom F. Behavioral Economics: A History 2014, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
133. Hillman A.L. Expressive behavior in economics and politics. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2010, 26:403-418.
134. Hillman A., Metsuyanim K., Potrafke N. Democracy with group identity. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:274-287. (in this issue).
135. Hirschman A.O. Having opinions: one of the elements of well-being?. Am. Econ. Rev. 1989, 79:75-79.
136. Hoffman E., McCabe K., Smith V. On expectations and monetary stakes in ultimatum games. Int. J. Game Theory 1996, 25:298-301.
137. Iyengar S., Lepper M. When choice is demotivating: can one desire too much of a good thing?. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 2000, 79:995-1006.
138. Jennings C., McLean I. Political economics and normative analysis. New Polit. Econ. 2008, 13:61-75.
139. Jennings C. The good, the bad and the populist: a model of political agency with emotional voters. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2011, 27:611-624.
140. Jennings C. Collective choice and individual action: education and social mobility in England. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:288-297. (in this issue).
141. Johnson-Laird P.N. Mental Models 1983, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
142. Jolls C., Sunstein C.R., Thaler R. A behavioral approach to law and economics. Stanford Law Rev. 1998, 50:1471-1549.
143. Jones P., Hudson J. Civic duty and expressive voting: is virtue its own reward?. Kyklos 2000, 53:3-16.
144. Kahneman D. Thinking: Fast and Slow 2011, Farrar Straus & Giroux, New York.
145. Kahneman D., Krueger A.B., Schkade D.A., Schwarz N., Stone A.A. Toward national well-being accounts. Am. Econ. Rev. 2004, 94:429-434.
146. Kahneman D., Renshon J. Hawkish biases. American Foreign Policy and the Threat of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11 2009, 79-96. Taylor & Francis, New York. T. Thrall, J. Cramer (Eds.).
147. Kahneman D., Tversky A. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 1979, 47:263-292.
148. Kamenica E. Behavioral economics and psychology of incentives. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2012, 4:13.1-13.26.
149. Keynes J.N. The Scope and Method of Political Economy 1917, Macmillan, London.
150. Kingdon J.W. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies 1995, Pearson, New York.
151. Kirchgässner G. Towards a theory of low-cost decisions. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 1992, 8:305-320.
152. Kirchgässner G. On some problems to apply the economic model of behavior in political science. Anal. Krit. 2008, 30:649-667.
153. Kirchgässner G. The role of homo oeconomicus in the political economy of James Buchanan. Constit. Polit. Econ. 2014, 25:2-17.
154. Kliemt H. The veil of insignificance. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 1986, 2:333-344.
155. Kliemt H. Public choice and political philosophy: reflections on the works of Gordon Spinoza and David Immanuel Buchanan. Public Choice 2005, 125:203-213.
156. Kotakorpi K., Poutvaara P. Pay for politicians and candidate selection: an empirical analysis. J. Public Econ. 2011, 95:877-885.
157. Kuehnhanss C.R., Heyndels B., Hilken K. Choice in politics: equivalency framing in economic policy decisions and the influence of expertise. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:260-274. (in this issue).
158. Kuran T. Cognitive limitations and preference evolution. J. Inst. Theor. Econ. 1991, 147:241-273.
159. Kuran T. Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification 1995, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
160. Kuran T., Sunstein C. Availability cascades and risk regulation. Stanford Law Rev. 1999, 51:683-768.
161. Larcinese V., Puglisi R., Snyder J.M. Partisan bias in economic news: evidence on the agenda-setting behavior of U.S. newspapers. J. Public Econ. 2011, 95:1178-1189.
162. Laffont J.J. Incentives and Political Economy 2001, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
163. Laibson D. Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Q. J. Econ. 1997, 112:443-477.
164. Layard R. Happiness and public policy: a challenge to the profession. Econ. J. 2006, 116:C24-C33.
165. Layard R. Happiness and the teaching of values. CentrePiece 2007, 12:18-23.
166. Leong C.K. The prince and the pauper: fairness through thick and thin veils of ignorance. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, (in this issue).
167. The hidden costs of reward. New Perspectives on the Psychology of Human Motivation 1978, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale. M.R. Lepper, D. Greene (Eds.).
168. Lindbeck A. Hazardous welfare-state dynamics. Am. Econ. Rev. 1995, 85:9-15.
169. Lindbeck A., Nyberg S. Raising children to work hard: altruism, work norms and social insurance. Q. J. Econ. 2006, 121:1473-1503.
170. Lindbeck A., Nyberg S., Weibull J. Social norms and economic incentives in the welfare state. Q. J. Econ. 1999, 114:1-35.
171. Loewenstein G., Haisley E.C. The economist as therapist: methodological ramifications of 'light' paternalism. The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics 2008, 210-245. Oxford University Press, Oxford. A. Caplin, A. Schotter (Eds.).
172. Lomasky L. Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan's 'The Myth of the Rational Voter'. Public Choice 2008, 135:469-484.
173. Lowery D. Lobbying influence: meaning, measurement and missing. Interes. Groups Advocacy 2013, 2:1-26.
174. Lupia A., McCubbins M.D. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? 1998, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
175. Mansbridge J. A selection model of political representation. J. Polit. Philos. 2009, 17:369-398.
176. McDermott M. Voting for myself: candidate and voter group associations over time. Elect. Stud. 2009, 28:606-614.
177. McQuillin B., Sugden R. Reconciling behavioural and normative economics: the problems to be solved. Soc. Choice Welf. 2012, 38:553-567.
178. Meier A., Slembeck T. Wirtschaftspolitik 1997, Ein kognitiv-evolutionärer Ansatz, Oldenbourg, Munich.
179. Mill J.S. Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy 1848, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, London. 7th ed.
180. Milligan K., Moretti E., Oreopoulus P. Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. J. Public Econ. 2004, 88:1667-1695.
181. Morton R. Other-regarding voting. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, (in this issue).
182. Mueller D.C. Public Choice III 2003, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
183. Mullainathan S., Schwartzstein J., Congdon W.J. A reduced-form approach to behavioral public finance. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2012, 4:511-540.
184. Noelle-Neumann E. The Spiral of Silence 1993, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
185. Nordin M. Do voters vote in line with their policy preferences?. CESifo Econ. Stud. 2014, 60:681-721.
186. North D.C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
187. North D.C. What do we mean by rationality?. Public Choice 1993, 77:159-162.
188. North D.C. Understanding the Process of Economic Change 2010, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
189. Oates W.E. On the nature and measurement of fiscal illusion: a survey. Taxation and Fiscal Federalism: Essays in Honor of Russell Mathews 1988, 65-82. Australian National University Press, Canberra. G. Brennan, B.S. Grewal, P.D. Groenewegen (Eds.).
190. Olken B.A. Direct democracy and local public goods: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 2010, 104:243-267.
191. Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action 1965, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
192. Osterloh S., Heinemann F. The political economy of corporate tax harmonization. Why do European politicians (dis-)like minimum tax rates?. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2013, 29:18-37.
193. Ostrom E. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action 1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
194. Ostrom E. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1998, 92:1-22.
195. Ostrom E. Unlocking public entrepreneurship and public economies. WIDER Discussion Paper 2005, United Nations University, Helsinki.
196. Ostrom, E., with contributions from Chang, C., Pennington, M., Tarko, V., 2012. The Future of the commons. Beyond market failure and government regulation. Institute for Economic Affairs, London.
197. Oswald A.J., Powdthavee N. Daughters and left-wing voting. Rev. Econ. Stat. 2010, 92:213-227.
198. Palfrey T.R. Experiments in political economy. Handbook of Experimental Economics 2012, vol. 2. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, (forthcoming). J. Kagel, A. Roth (Eds.).
199. Pelikan P. The government economic agenda in a society of unequally rational individuals. Kyklos 2010, 63:231-255.
200. Peltzman S. Toward a more general theory of regulation. J. Law Econ. 1976, 19:211-240.
201. Persson T., Tabellini G. Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy 2000, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
202. Plott C. Committee and voting: applications of experiments to public choice. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, (in this issue).
203. Plott C., Smith V.L. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results 2008, North Holland, Amsterdam.
204. Puglisi R. Being the New York Times: the political behavior of a newspaper. B.E. J. Econ. Anal. Policy 2011, 11. (Article 20).
205. Quattrone G.A., Tversky A. Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1988, 82:719-736.
206. Rabin M. Psychology and economics. J. Econ. Lit. 1998, 36:11-46.
207. Rabin M., Schrag J. First impressions matter: a model of confirmatory bias. Q. J. Econ. 1999, 114:37-81.
208. Read D. Which side are you on? The ethics of self-command. J. Econ. Psychol. 2006, 27:681-693.
209. Rebonato R. Taking Liberties 2012, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
210. Riker W., Ordeshook P. A theory of the calculus of voting. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1968, 62:25-42.
211. Rizzo M.J., Whitman D.G. Little brother is watching you: new paternalism on the slippery slopes. Ariz. Law Rev. 2009, 51:685-739.
212. Roemer J.E., Lee W., Van der Straeten K. Racism, xenophobia and redistribution. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2006, 4:454-466.
213. Rose-Ackermann S. Risk-taking and re-election: does federalism promote innovation?. J. Leg. Stud. 1980, 9:593-616.
214. Rotemberg J. Attitude-dependent altruism, turnout and voting. Public Choice 2009, 140:223-244.
215. Roth A.E., Prasnikar V., Okuno-Fujiwara M., Zamir S. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: an experimental study. Am. Econ. Rev. 1991, 81:1068-1095.
216. Rubin P.H. How humans make political decisions. Jurimetrics 2001, 41:337-356.
217. Rubinstein A., Salant Y. Eliciting welfare preferences from behavioral data sets. Rev. Econ. Stud. 2012, 79:375-387.
218. Saint-Paul G. The Tyranny of Utility. Behavioral Social Science and the Rise of Paternalism 2011, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
219. Samuelson P.A. The pure theory of public expenditure. Rev. Econ. Stat. 1954, 36:387-389.
220. Sasaki T., Brännström Å., Dieckmann U., Sigmund K. The take-it-or-leave-it-option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 2012, 109:1165-1169.
221. Schnellenbach J. The Dahrendorf hypothesis and its implications for (the theory of) economic policy-making. Camb. J. Econ. 2005, 29:997-1009.
222. Schnellenbach J. Public entrepreneurship and the economics of reform. J. Inst. Econ. 2007, 3:183-202.
223. Schnellenbach J. Nudges and norms: on the political economy of soft paternalism. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2012, 28:266-277.
224. Schnellenbach J., Schubert C. Behavioral political economy: a survey. CESifo Working Paper No. 4988 2014, CESifo, Munich.
225. Schubert C. Pursuing happiness. Kyklos 2012, 65:245-261.
226. Schubert C. How to evaluate creative destruction: reconstructing Schumpeter's approach. Camb. J. Econ. 2013, 37:227-250.
227. Schubert C. Evolutionary economics and the case for constitutional libertarian paternalism. J. Evol. Econ. 2014, 24:1107-1113.
228. Schubert C. Opportunity and preference learning. Econ. Philos. 2015, (forthcoming).
229. Schuessler A.A. Expressive voting. Ration. Soc. 2000, 12:87-119.
230. Schumpeter J.A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 1942, Harper & Row, New York.
231. Scott J., Matland R., Michelbach P., Bornstein B. Just deserts: an experimental study of distributive justice norms. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 2001, 45:749-767.
232. Shayo M., Harel A. Non-consequentialist voting. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2012, 81:299-313.
233. Simon H.A. Rationality as process and as product of thought. Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc. 1978, 68:1-16.
234. Simon H.A. Rationality in political behavior. Polit. Psychol. 1995, 16:45-61.
235. Slembeck T. The formation of economic policy: a cognitive-evolutionary approach to policy-making. Constit. Polit. Econ. 1997, 8:225-254.
236. Smith A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments 1759/1976, The Liberty Press, Indianapolis.
237. Snowberg E., Ortoleva P. Are conservatives overconfident?. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:333-344. (in this issue).
238. Spiegler R. Placebo reforms. Am. Econ. Rev. 2013, 103:1490-1506.
239. Stern C., West T.V., Schmitt P.G. The liberal illusion of uniqueness. Psychol. Sci. 2014, 25:137-144.
240. Stigler G.J. The theory of economic regulation. Bell J. Econ. Manag. Sci. 1971, 2:3-21.
241. Stigler G.J. The Economist as a Preacher and Other Essays 1982, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
242. Strömberg D. Radio's impact on public spending. Q. J. Econ. 2004, 119:189-221.
243. Strumpf K. Does government decentralization promote policy innovation?. J. Pub. Econ. Theory 2002, 4:207-241.
244. Sugden R. The opportunity criterion: consumer sovereignty without the assumption of coherent preferences. Am. Econ. Rev. 2004, 94:1014-1033.
245. Sugden R. Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism. Constit. Polit. Econ. 2008, 19:226-248.
246. Sugden R. Opportunity as mutual advantage. Econ. Philos. 2010, 26:47-68.
247. Sugden R. The behavioural economist and the social planner: to whom should behavioural welfare economics be addressed?. Papers on Economics and Evolution 1121 2011, MPI for Economics, Jena.
248. Sunstein C.R., Thaler R.H. Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. University of Chicago Law Review 2003, 70:1159-1202.
249. Sunstein C.R., Thaler R.H. Libertarian paternalism. Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc. 2003, 93.
250. Survey of Americans, Economists on the Economy 1996, (http://www2.kff.org/content/archive/1196/econgen.html). The Washington Post, Kaiser Foundation, Harvard University (Eds.).
251. Tasic S. Are regulators rational?. J. Econ. Etudes Hum. 2011, 17.
252. Thaler R.H., Benartzi S. Save more tomorrow. Using behavioral economics to increase employee savings. J. Polit. Econ. 2004, 112:164-187.
253. Thaler R.H., Sunstein C.R. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 2008, Yale University Press, New Haven.
254. Thomas M.D., Thomas D.W., Snow N.A. Rational irrationality and the political process: the women's organization for national prohibition reform and the 21st amendment. Kyklos 2013, 66:130-152.
255. Torgler B., Stadelmann D., Portmann M. The power of religious organizations in human decision processes: analyzing voting behaviour. CESifo Working Paper No. 4526 2013, CESifo, Munich.
256. Tullock G. Problems of majority voting. J. Polit. Econ. 1959, 67:571-579.
257. Tullock G. Toward a Mathematics of Politics 1967, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
258. Tullock G. The charity of the uncharitable. West. Econ. J. 1971, 9:379-392.
259. Tullock G. Some further thoughts on voting. Public Choice 2000, 104:181-182.
260. Tyran J.-R. Voting when money and morals conflict. An experimental test of expressive voting. J. Pub. Econ. 2004, 88:1645-1664.
261. Traut-Mattausch E., Jonas E., Förg M., Frey D., Heinemann F. How should politicians justify reforms to avoid psychological reactance, negative attitudes and financial dishonesty?. J. Psychol. 2008, 216:218-225.
262. Tversky A., Kahneman D. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science 1974, 185:1124-1131.
263. Tyran J.-R., Feld L.P. Tax evasion and voting: an experimental analysis. Kyklos 2002, 55:197-222.
264. Tyran J.-R., Sausgruber R. Are we taxing ourselves? How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes. J. Public Econ. 2011, 96:164-176.
265. Urbatsch R. The paradox of voting intelligently. Public Choice 2012, 150:511-524.
266. Vanberg V.J. Evolving preferences and welfare economics: the perspective of constitutional political economy. Jahrb. National. Stat. 2014, 234:328-349.
267. Van der Rijt J.-W. Public policy and the conditional value of happiness. Econ. Philos. 2013, 29:381-408.
268. Van Winden F. On the economic theory of interest groups. Towards a group frame of reference in political economics. Public Choice 1999, 100:1-29.
269. Van Winden F. Affective public choice. Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy 2007, 45-61. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. J. Casas Pardo, P. Schwartz (Eds.).
270. Van Winden F. Political economy with affect: on the role of emotions and relationships. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, 40:298-311. (in this issue).
271. Voigt S. Implicit constitutional change: changing the meaning of the constitution without changing the text of the document. Eur. J. Law Econ. 1999, 7:197-224.
272. Wallerstein M. Behavioral economics and political economy. Nord. J. Polit. Econ. 2004, 30:37-48.
273. Warren P.L., Wood D.H. The political economy of regulation in markets with naive consumers. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2014, 12:1617-1642.
274. Washington E. Female socialization: how daughters affect their legislator fathers' voting on women's issues. Am. Econ. Rev. 2007, 98:311-332.
275. Wilson R.K. The contribution of behavioral economics to political science. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2011, 14:201-223.
276. Witt U. Economic policy-making in evolutionary perspective. J. Evol. Econ. 2003, 13:77-94.
277. Wittman D. Why democracies produce efficient results. J. Polit. Econ. 1989, 97:1395-1424.
278. Wohlgemuth M. Evolutionary approaches to politics. Kyklos 2002, 55:223-246.
279. Zhang Y., Wang M. Towards behavioral political economy of institutional change: with field facts from China. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2015, (in this issue).