Group formation and political conflict: Instrumental and expressive approaches

Public Choice

Volumn 118, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 413-435

  Hamlin, Alan ^a   Jennings, Colin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3843144030     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/b:puch.0000019908.98720.1e     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Akerlof, G.A. and Kranton, R.E. (2000). Economics and identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 715-753.
2. Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). An economic model of representative democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 85-114.
3. Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (1998). Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 95: 149-175.
4. Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (1999). On political representation. British Journal of Political Science 29: 109-127.
5. Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (2000). Democratic devices and desires. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Brennan, G. and Lomasky, L. (1993). Democracy and decision. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Demsetz, H. (1990). Amenity potential, indivisibilities and political competition. In J.E. Alt and K.A. Shepsle (Eds.), Perspectives on positive political economy, Ch. 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
9. Garfinkel, M.R. and Skaperdas, S. (Eds.) (1996). The political economy of conflict and appropriation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Hamlin, A. and Hjortland, M. (2000). Proportional representation with citizen candidates. Public Choice 103: 205-230.
11. Hardin, R. (1995). One for all: The logic of group conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. Hirshleifer, J. (1988). The analytics of continuing conflict. Synthese 76: 201-233.
13. Hirshleifer, J. (1995). Theorizing about conflict. In K. Hartley and T. Sandler (Eds.), Handbook of defense economics, Vol. 1, Ch. 7. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
14. Kuran, T. (1995). Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
15. Osborne, M.J. and Slivinski, A. (1996). A model of political competition with citizen candidates. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 65-96.
16. Schelling, T. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
17. Schuessler, A.A. (2000). A logic of expressive choice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
18. Usher, D. (1992). The welfare economics of markets, voting and predation. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
19. Van Winden, F. (1999). On the economic theory of interest groups: Towards a group frame of reference in political economics. Public Choice 100: 1-29.