Tax evasion and voting: An experimental analysis

Kyklos

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 197-221

  Feld, Lars P ^a,b   Tyran, Jean Robert ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; INCOME; POLITICAL ECONOMY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0036095417     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00183     Document Type: Article

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